

Phil 3301: Philosophy of Mind
Spring 2019, University of Texas, El Paso
Class Meets: M, W 1:30—2:50 p.m., Quinn Hall 202

Professor Marc A. Moffett
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Office: Worrell 202
Office Hrs: M 9:00–10:00 a.m.,
T 1:00–2:00 p.m.,
& by appointment.

Free and open discussion is the life-blood of philosophy. Consequently, no student shall be discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, disability, place of national origin, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, political affiliation or any other similar factor. I expect all members of the class to be equally tolerant of differing perspectives and ideologies. Critique, evaluate and analyze the ideas put forward by me and others; do not demean or belittle them.

Course Description

The philosophy of mind is ultimately a dialectic between two opposing schools of thought—physicalism and dualism. Physicalists maintain that everything in the world may ultimately be accounted for in terms of certain fundamental physical properties. The dualist denies this. According to the dualist, the mind is something wholly new under the sun. This course is structured around the ongoing debate between these two schools of thought. We will begin with a dilemma: On the one hand, we will discuss some arguments that (purport to) show that the mind and the body cannot be identical (The Identity Theory); on the other hand, we will discuss some arguments that (purport to) show that the mind and the body cannot be distinct (Dualism). We will then take a long, hard look at the most promising way out of this dilemma, the Functional Theory of Mind.

Although the course is centered around this dispute between physicalists and dualists, the issues will force us to consider a number of other important topics in the philosophy of mind. These include problems of mental causation, externalism about mental content, and introspective knowledge of one's mental states.

Required Materials

Required Texts

- Chalmers, David (Ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002.
- A course packet available electronically.

Optional

- *A good stiff cup of java!*

Course Objectives

- To develop a critical understanding of the fundamental nature of the mind.
- To develop an ability to clearly express and defend not only your own opinions on these matters, as well as the views and arguments of those with whom you disagree.

Requirements and Expectations

This course is an upper division philosophy course. Students will be expected to have academic skills commensurate with its level including: the ability to read complex primary source material, the ability to write clear, well-constructed essays, and the ability to engage in articulate and respectful discourse. In addition, I expect all students to be prepared and attentive in class. This means coming to class having done reading assignments and having thought about their significance, and while in class being an active listener and contributor. Although I will not take attendance, I do expect you attend every class meeting. You are responsible for all material and announcements made in class, whether you are present or not. No late assignments will be allowed without a University excuse.

PLEASE NOTE: If you have or suspect you have a physical, learning, or psychological disability and require accommodations, please contact the Center for Accommodations and Support Services located in the Union Bldg East, room 106 (747-5148).

Evaluation:

- **E-journal (25% of total grade):** You are to write a short (< 1 page) exploratory/critical response to the week's material. *Every entry must include: (1) An explanation/exposition of some point made in the readings and (2) a reflective, critical response to that point.* The journal is designed to get the student to engage the course material on a regular basis. This material need not be highly polished. Instead, you will be graded on a five-point scale with your score reflecting both your grasp of the material and effort/insight.
- **Short essay (15% of total grade):** Very short (3 pp.) expository essay. This essay will ask you to *state and criticize some position you favor concerning the mind-body problem.* Further details will be handed out in class.
- **Essay prospectus (10% of total grade):** The essay prospectus is a short overview of your research essay. It will state as clearly as possible the problem you will address and your overall line of argumentation in the paper.
- **Research essay (25% of total grade):** A substantial, focused critical discussion that develops the ideas in your prospectus. You may write on any topic relevant to the course, but the more narrowly you focus your discussion the better the paper will be. (For example, "I am going to argue that such-and-such specific claim made by Dualists is problematic" is much better than "I am going to argue that Dualism is false.").
- **Midterm exam (25% of total grade):** In class exam.

The grading scale for this class is given below:

A	B	C	D	F
>89.5%	>79.5%	>69.5%	>59.5%	≤59.5%

Academic Integrity

Academic integrity is a concern for everyone. By joining the UTEP community every student agrees to abide by the Scholastic Dishonesty Policy. Any student who commits an act of scholastic dishonesty is subject to discipline. Scholastic dishonesty includes, but not limited to cheating, plagiarism, collusion, the submission for credit of any work or materials that are attributable to another person.

Cheating

- Copying from the test paper of another student
- Communicating with another student during a test
- Giving or seeking aid from another student during a test

- Possession and/or use of unauthorized materials during tests (i.e. Crib notes, class notes, books, etc)
- Substituting for another person to take a test
- Falsifying research data, reports, academic work offered for credit

Plagiarism

- Using someone's work in your assignments without the proper citations
- Submitting the same paper or assignment from a different course, without direct permission of instructors

Collusion

- Unauthorized collaboration with another person in preparing academic assignments

Class Schedule: The following is a detailed schedule of classes. The schedule, however, is flexible. I will freely amend it as time, interest and comprehension dictate.

PofM = David Chalmers (Ed.). *Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

CP = Course Packet.

W Jan. 23 Introduction: Logic, Analysis and Philosophic Methodology

The Mind/Body Problem: Dualism and the Identity Thesis

M Jan. 28 Overview of the Mind/Body Problem.

W Jan. 30 Cartesian Dualism
 • René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (II and VI), **PofM**.

M Feb. 04 The Problem of Interaction
 • Karen Bennett, “Mental Causation,” **CP**
 • Keith Campbell, “How the Mind-Body Problem Arises,” **CP**.

W Feb. 06 Type Identity Theory
 • J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and brain processes,” **PofM**.

M Feb. 11 The Modal/Multiple-Realizability Arguments.
 • Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Lecture 3), **PofM**.

W Feb. 13 Token Identity Theory: Anomalous Monism
 • Donald Davidson, Mental Events, **PofM**.

M Feb. 18 Events and Causation
 • Jaegwon Kim, “TBD,” **CP**.

W Feb. 20 The Metaphysics of Fitness.
 • Chapter 3, §§ 3.5—3.6, **PofB**

M Feb. 25 Behaviorism: Type Identity Theory Revisited
 • Gilbert Ryle, “Descartes’ Myth,” **PofM**

W Feb. 27 Against Behaviorism
 • Hilary Putnam, “Brains and Behavior,” **PofM**

M Mar. 04 Catch-up/Discussion

Functionalism

W Mar. 06 Emergent Properties
 • C. D. Broad, “Mechanism and its alternatives,” **PofM**
 • Jerry Fodor, “Special sciences,” **PofM**.

M Mar. 11 Turing Machines and the Nature of the Mind
 • Hilary Putnam, “The nature of mental states,” **PofM**.

W Mar. 13 Catch-up/Discussion [**Short Essay Due**]

M	Mar. 18	SPRING BREAK
W	Mar. 20	SPRING BREAK
M	Mar. 25	Mid-term Exam (Sorry)

Problems with Functionalism

W	Mar. 27	Ramsification and Functional Definition <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Lewis, “Psychophysical and theoretical identifications,” PofM.
M	Apr. 01	The Certainty/Knowledge Arguments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal qualia,” PofM • Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?,” PofM
W	Apr. 03	The Ability Response <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Lewis, “What experience teaches,” PofM
M	Apr. 08	The Conceivability Argument <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Chalmers, “The Hard Problem” (excerpt from <i>The Conscious Mind</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) CP
W	Apr. 10	Catch-up/Discussion
M	Apr. 15	The Explanatory Gap <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joseph Levine, “Materialism and qualia,” PofM.
W	Apr. 17	Apr. 15 Mysterianism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colin McGinn, “Can we solve the mind-body problem?” PofM.

Functionalism and the Non-wellfounded Mind

M	Apr. 22	Intentionality & Propositional Attitudes [Prospectus Due] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Franz Brentano, “The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena,” PofM • Gottlob Frege, “On sense and reference,” CP.
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Dualism Revisited

W	Apr. 24	Functionalism and Intentionality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • George Bealer, “Self-conscious Thought: The Really Hard Problem,” CP • George Bealer, “Self-consciousness,” <i>Philosophical Review</i>, 106: 69-117 (1997). CP
M	Apr. 29	Mental Causation Revisited <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stephen Yablo, “Mental Causation,” PofM.
W	May 01	Mental Causation Revisited (Cont’d) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • George Bealer, “Mental Causation,” CP.
M	May 06	TBD
W	May 08	Catch-up/Discussion
M	May 13	FINAL ESSAY DUE